6 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

Special Assistant to the President

SUBJECT :

The Chinese Communist Military Threat to

India

- 1. There are several reasons to be concerned over the possibility of a Chinese Communist attack on the Sino-Indian border. First, the weather becomes favorable for military operations and continues favorable until toward the end of the year in mid-September. Second, the Chicoms have forces in Tibet (around 120,000) capable of launching an attack on the scale of last fall with little or no warning, and, in fact, they have improved their logistical position by improving roads and establishing supply dumps. Finally, the Chicoms may have a political or psychological urge to demonstrate their militancy and their lack of fear of their enemies by giving the Indians another black eye right in front of both the Russians and the Americans. They may think a limited military foray would carry little risk of direct involvement with U.S. forces.
- 2. On the other hand, there is no solid evidence of concrete preparations for attack. Joe Alsop's articles reflect concern in New Delhi where memories of last fall's military debacle are still fresh. The Indians are supersensitive to any indication of Chinese military activity, and they have tended to exaggerate the evidence of the rather limited activity that we know about and to interpret it as a build-up for immediate attack. While we cannot be sure we would get any warning of intent to attack in this region on the relatively small scale of forces that would be involved, we are confident that such firm information as we have supports the capability to attack and does not support a clear intent to attack.

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- 3. The Chinese have directed a number of harsh propaganda blasts at India since their withdrawal last fall, but the tone and volume have been much more restrained than immediately prior to the opening of hostilities last year. Both Foreign Minister Chen Yi and the authoritative People's Daily have recently reaffirmed China's intention to settle the border problem peacefully, although Peiping has warned New Delhi that it must bear the consequences for any rash actions in the future. In this connection, a Chinese Communist note to New Delhi of 1 September issued the last of a series of strong protests against Indian activities in border areas.
- their option of attacking again this fall if, in their view, the advantages outweigh the risks of provoking the Indians to establish a more effective Indian military posture on the border with the assistance of greater commitments of American and Russian support. On balance, our feeling is that Peiping will decide that for the time being the potential disadvantages outweigh the short-term gains of another border excursion right now.

RAY S. CLINE Deputy Director (Intelligence)

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